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JURISDk • ^ o . U . - . u : Mi > :
This Court has jurisdiction o\ cr iiiis appeal pursuant to I'tah Code Ann. § 78-2-

2(3)0).
'.' STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESFiN'l ED FOR REVIEW
Whether House Bill 213 effects an unconstitutional taking of State employees'
contractual employment benefits and thus should be permanent!) enjoined.
* i*

Preservation of the Issue Bcim

v, .1 rriicd .u ^ ::LIII in the district court in connection with appellants' motion lur
preliminary injunction and the State's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and during
the evidentiary 1 learing on the n lotion foi pi elii i lii iar> ii iji n ictioi i Add / u issim.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTE^
1.

Article I, § 22 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Private property shai • . >c idkcn u. dama^a ;- ; rui.uv .^e -::;;, .;i ;.. .;
compensation.

2.

' Prior to its amendment by HB 213, Utah Code Ann. §67-19-14.2 provided:
Unused Sick Leave Retirement Option Program - Creation - Payout at
retirement- Continuing medical and. life insurance benefits after
retirement
i i ;• ui) There is created the "Unused Sick Leave Retirement Option
Program "
(P) An agenex n;^. w._: m. „n^ed SICK Lea\e Retirement Option
Program to an employee who is eligible to receive retirement benefits in
accordance with Title 49, Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act.

1

Because of the abbreviated niieiing ^eneuuie. UK. ia» \-.t ^u tij»pcai na^ mu uuu;
for use in the preparation of this brief. Relevant portions of the record ha\ e K -^"
included in the separate Addendum ("Add.") that accompanies this bnei.
1

(c) An employee's participation in any part of the Unused Sick Leave
Retirement Option Program is voluntary.
(2) The Unused Sick Leave Retirement Option Program provides that upon
retirement an employee:
(a) is paid for up to 25% of the employee's unused accumulated sick
leave at the employee's rate of pay at the time of retirement;
(b) receives continuing medical and life insurance benefits until the
employee reaches the age eligible for Medicare or for up to five years,
which ever occurs sooner; and
(c) may purchase additional continuing medical and life insurance
benefits in accordance with Subsection (4).
(3) An employee may have monies from the pay out under Subsection
(2)(a) transferred directly to the deferred compensation plan qualified under
Section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code which is sponsored by the
Utah State Retirement Board.
(4) (a) An employee may purchase continuing medical and life insurance
benefits, at the rate of one month's coverage per policy for eight hours of
unused sick leave remaining after:
(i) the pay out of unused sick leave under Subsection (2)(a); and
(ii) an additional reduction of 480 hours of unused sick leave.
(b) The medical coverage level for member, two person, or family
coverage that is provided to the member at the time of retirement is the
maximum coverage level available to the member under this program.
(c) The purchase of continuing medical and life insurance benefits at the
rate provided under Subsection (4)(a) may be used by the employee to
extend coverage:
(i) beyond the five years provided under Subsection (2) until the
employee reaches the age of eligibility for Medicare; or
(ii) if the employee has reached the age of eligibility for Medicare,
continuing medical benefits for the employee's spouse may be purchased
until the employee's spouse reaches the age of eligibility for Medicare.

2

(d) An employee ai,.: ;;.e ompi.Ace's spouse \\no arc ^; WIR- -L«..
become eligible for Medicare may purchase Medicare supplemental
insurance at the rate of one month's coverage i'oi eight hours of the
employee's unused, sick leave per person. ' ...
3. ''' " I IB 213 i ii nended I Jl \ ih C( »de , \J:II § 67 19 1 1.2 1 i »i ea... I., is f< >11< m s :
Unused Sick Leave Retirement Option Program - Creation - PayuJiui
. retirement - Continuing medical and life insurance benefits alter
retirement.
•...'.-.•
Program I."
(b) An agency may offer the Unused Sick Leave Retirement Option
Program I to an employee who is eligible to receive retirement benefits in
accordance with. Title 49,1 Jtah State R e t i r ^ e r * T J !«.-;. r -^ c .. Monefjt \ :.i
f 2) The i : nused Sick Leave Retirement Option Program. I provides that
upoi; retirement an employee who was employed by the state prior to
Januan
"00^:
(a) receives a contribution undci Subsection (3) for 2 5 % of the
employee's unused accumulated sick iea\ c accrued prior to January 1,
2006, at the employee's rate of pa\ at the time of retirement:
(b) i eceiv es coi itli n liiii:
earlier of:

. - . ,.

(i) the date the employee reaches the age eligible for Medicare; or

'. A) five years if the e m p k n e e retires during calendar year 2006;
(13) foi ii* yeai s if the ei nployee retires d!.i u: it lg calendar year 2007;
(C) three years if the employee retires during calendar year 2008;
(I)) tvv o years if tl le ei i iplo> ee retires di ii Ii lg calei idai y Cc

1J fc !:

'

(E) one year if the employee retires during calendar year 20 li . or
"(F) zei o year s if tl ic ei nplo;;; >ee retii es af tei calei idar y ear .

3

i.d

(c) may purchase additional continuing medical and life insurance
benefits in accordance with Subsection (4).
(3) (a) Subject to federal requirements and limitations, the contribution
under Subsection (2)(a) shall be transferred directly to the employee's
defined contribution plan qualified under Section 401(k) of the Internal
Revenue Code which is sponsored by the Utah State Retirement Board.
(b) If the amount calculated under Subsection (2)(a) exceeds the federal
contribution limitations, the employee's unused accumulated sick leave
hours representing the excess shall be used for the purchase of continuing
medical and life insurance benefits under Subsection (4).
(4) (a) An employee may purchase continuing medical and life insurance
benefits, at the rate of one month's coverage per policy for eight hours of
unused sick leave remaining after:
(i) the contribution of unused sick leave under Subsection (2)(a); and
(ii) an additional reduction, at the time of retirement, of unused sick
leave hours as follows:
(A) 480 hours if the employee retires during calendar year 2006;
(B) 384 hours if the employee retires during calendar year 2007;
(C) 288 hours if the employee retires during calendar year 2008;
(D) 192 hours if the employee retires during calendar year 2009;
(E) 96 hours if the employee retires during calendar year 2010; or
(F) 0 hours if the employee retires after calendar year 2010.
(b) The medical coverage level for member, two person, or family
coverage that is provided to the member at the time of retirement is the
maximum coverage level available to the member under this program.
(c) The purchase of continuing medical and life insurance benefits at the
rate provided under Subsection (4)(a) may be used by the employee to
extend coverage:
(i) beyond the number of years provided under Subsection (2) until
the employee reaches the age of eligibility for Medicare; or

4

(ii) if the employee has reached the age of eligibility for Medicare,
continuing medical benefits for the employee's spouse may be purchased
until the employee's spouse reaches the age of eligibility for Medicare.
(d) An employee and the employee's spouse who are or who later
become eligible for Medicare may purchase Medicare supplemental
insurance at the rate of one month's coverage for eight hours of the
employee's unused sick leave per person.

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
The Utah Public Employees Association ("UPEA") and Roes 1 through 5

(collectively "Plaintiffs") challenge the constitutionality of HB 213 ("Unused Sick Leave
at Retirement Amendments"), which amends Utah Code § 67-19-14.2 so as to
significantly devalue accrued but unused sick leave of State employees. Plaintiffs
contend that HB 213 effects an uncompensated, and thus unconstitutional, taking of State
employees' contractual employment benefits.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on June 29, 2005, and thereafter moved for a

preliminary injunction to stay the effective date of HB 213 pending resolution of
litigation. Add. 26, 42. The State opposed that motion, and moved for judgment on the
pleadings. Add. 60. After briefing and evidentiary hearings held November 7, 9, 16 and
18, 2005, the District Court on December 8, 2005 ruled from the bench denying
Plaintiffs' motion and granting the State's motion. Add. 359-60. The District Court also
denied Plaintiffs' motion for a stay pending appeal. Add. 362.
Plaintiffs petitioned this Court for emergency relief on December 13, 2005. Add.
365. On December 14, 2005, the Court granted the petition and enjoined the
implementation of HB 213 insofar as it amends Utah Code § 67-19-14.2 until thirty days
after final disposition of this appeal. Add. 22. On December 15, 2005, the Court (1)
denied the State's motion to vacate the order granting emergency relief, (2) ordered
Plaintiffs to perfect an appeal on or before December 29, 2005, and (3) ordered expedited
6

briefing. Add. 24.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Identity of the Plaintiffs.

The UPEA is a labor association representing the interests of current and former
public employees on matters pertaining to public employment. Add. 93. The individual
Roe Plaintiffs are State employees and UPEA members who, like thousands of State
employees, have relied upon the State's representations in accumulating thousands of
sick leave hours, and now are adversely affected by HB 213. Add. 45-59. Prior to
commencing this action, the UPEA canvassed its members who overwhelmingly
supported initiation of this litigation to challenge HB 213 and protect their rights.
Add. 99.
2.

The Current "Unused Sick Leave Retirement Option Program" Allows
State Agencies to Offer a Substantial Retirement Benefit to Employees;
Employees Rely on that Benefit by Banking Unused Sick Leave.

For more than 25 years, the State has represented to its employees that employee
benefits are an integral part of their current compensation, which is well below market
rates. Indeed, the State trumpets its comparatively generous benefits "as inducements to
work for the [S]tate." Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3(16) (2005).2 The Unused Sick Leave
Retirement Option Program ("Program") is one particularly important benefit that State
agencies may choose to offer as an inducement to their employees to continue
employment with the State. It encourages them to refrain from using their sick leave in

All citations to the Utah Code are to the relevant statutes as they stand prior to the
amendments wrought by HB 213.
7

exchange for the promise that they can trade their unused sick leave for post-retirement
health insurance coverage. See id. § 67-19-14(1) (1983) (authorizing DHRM to make
rules "as an incentive to reduce sick leave abuse").
In its present form, the Program gives retiring employees:
•

Continuing medical and life insurance benefits for up to five years or until
age 65, which ever occurs first; and

•

In exchange for unused accumulated sick leave:
o A cash payment or an employer contribution to a 401(k) retirement
plan of up to 25% of the employee's unused accumulated sick leave
at the employee's rate of pay at the time of retirement; and/or
o After subtracting 480 hours from any remaining amount of unused
sick leave, the right to purchase continuing medical and life
insurance coverage (including Medicare supplemental insurance) for
the employee and/or spouse at the rate of one month of coverage for
every eight hours of unused sick leave.

See Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14.2 (2005) (emphasis added).
The Program "is optional for each agency," and agencies must decide anew
whether or not to offer the Program each fiscal year. Utah Admin. Code R477-7-6; Utah
Code Ann. § 67-19-14.2(l)(b). Moreover, for over two decades (since the early 1980s),
agencies bore the costs of the Program for their employees without any legislative
appropriation. See Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14(d) (2004). Due to its popularity,
essentially all State agencies have elected to offer the Program to their employees,
including the agencies employing the Roe Plaintiffs. Add. 45, 48, 51, 56, 58.
Over the Program's long history, the vast majority of retiring employees have used
100% of their unused sick leave (above the 480-hour threshold) to continue medical and

8

life insurance coverage instead of taking any cash payout or retirement plan contribution.
Add. 46, 49, 52, 56, 59. The continuing insurance coverage option is far and away the
most valuable use of accrued sick leave. An analysis prepared by the State of payments
made to retiring employees over the past five fiscal years demonstrates that, while the
amount paid out in cash or 401 (k) contributions has remained flat or slightly declined, the
amount paid out for continuing health insurance greatly exceeds the cash or 401(k)
payments and has increased each year. Add. 339. In fact, the Program has created a
substantial incentive for State employees to forego using their sick leave during their
employment so as to accumulate as much unused sick leave as possible for postretirement insurance coverage. Add. 46, 49, 52, 56, 59.
All of the Roe Plaintiffs, like most eligible UPEA members and other State
employees, have accrued their sick leave to secure post-retirement insurance coverage
rather than taking a cash payment or retirement plan contribution. Add. 46, 49, 52, 56,
59. In reliance on the Program, Plaintiffs have foregone taking sick leave during their
employment by, for example, working more hours or taking personal leave (which can be
used for any purpose) instead of sick leave (which can only be used when the employee
or a family member is ill or for medical visits) when a medical need prevented them from
working. The Roe Plaintiffs alone have banked more than 8,000 hours of unused sick
leave. Add. 46, 49, 52, 56, 59. Since employees accumulate sick leave at the rate of only
104 hours per year, this represents eight decades worth of banked sick leave by just these
five individuals; Thus, on tens of thousands of occasions over the past two decades, the

9

Roe Plaintiffs and thousands of other State employees have intentionally foregone using
their sick leave in reliance on the existing program.
Some employees, such as Roe Plaintiff Terry Yockey, have accumulated so many
hours that it is not possible to use them prior to retirement. Mr. Yockey, who will retire
in April 2006, has accumulated over 1900 sick leave hours and thus cannot possibly use
more than a small fraction of those hours as legitimate sick leave prior to his retirement
date. Add. 46.
The widespread practice of banking sick leave has substantially benefited the
State. It curbs sick leave abuses; saves the costs of replacement workers; maximizes
productivity; and postpones expenses - with the State compensating employees years, or
even decades, after receiving the benefit of employees not using their sick leave hours.
3.

HB 213 Changes the Program, and Unless Enjoined, Will Materially
Devalue 25% of Employees' Banked Sick Leave.

HB 213 substantially devalues unused sick leave accumulated prior to January 1,
2006 may be used. Unused sick leave hours accumulated prior to January 1, 2006 fold
into what is now designated "Program I." Another new program, "Program II," applies
to sick leave accumulated on and after January 1, 2006. Instead of allowing retiring
employees to exchange all their accrued sick leave above the 480-hour threshold for the
purchase of post-retirement health care coverage as they were promised, Program I now
requires employees to take 25% of their unused leave as an employer contribution to their
401(k) plans, which has a much lower value than the insurance coverage. Add. 333-34
(Enrolled Copy of HB 213, § 67-19-14.2(2)(a)).

10

The precise impact of HB 213 on already-accumulated unused sick leave will vary
by employee. The District Court found that some employees would receive less benefits
under HB 213, some would receive the same, and some would receive more. Add. 9
(Finding of Fact 21). However, only the first of these conclusions is supported by
evidence; the second two are based on purely hypothetical scenarios with no
consideration of practical reality.
As for the first group - those clearly hurt by HB 213 - Plaintiffs presented
substantial evidence and expert testimony of HB 213's negative impact on those like the
Roe Plaintiffs if they retired on their anticipated retirement dates. Because of HB 213,
Terry Yockey, Roe 1, will lose five years (60 months) of health insurance for his
accumulated unused sick leave if he retires on his previously planned May 1, 2006
retirement date. Uncontested expert testimony placed the present value of that lost
insurance at $32,572. Under the new Program I, the State will instead make a $14,131
contribution to Mr. Yockey's 401(k). Add. 382. This represents a 57% decrease in the
value of the portion of Mr. Yockey's unused sick leave that HB 213 requires be used for
a 401 (k) contribution.
Robert Anderson, Roe 2, is similarly affected. He will lose six years (72 months)
of health insurance for his accumulated unused sick leave, with a present value of
$41,194. Instead, under Program I, the State will make a $14,910 retirement plan
contribution, a 64% decrease in value. Add. 385.
Both Mrr Yockey and Mr. Anderson are eligible to retire, although neither had
intended to retire as early as required to avoid the effect of HB 213. Add. 46, 50. Unless
11

the statute is enjoined, they will face an immediate decision of whether to retire early or
forfeit the full value of their banked sick leave hours.
Roe 4 and 5 are not eligible to retire (Add. 56, 59), but will suffer comparable
adverse effects without the option of immediate retirement. Anna Anderson, Roe 4, will
lose over four years (50 months) of health insurance for her accumulated unused sick
leave. That $45,054 present value will be off-set by a $10,952 retirement plan
contribution from the State, a 76% decrease in the value of those accrued hours. Add.
388. Roe 5 will lose over two years (25 months) of health insurance for accumulated
unused sick leave. That $35,221 present value will be off-set by a $3,546 retirement plan
contribution, a 90% reduction. Add. 391.
In general terms, the Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst estimates an average
adverse impact on State employees of approximately $600 for every eight hours of
accumulated unused sick leave: an employee paid $20 an hour will receive a retirement
plan contribution of $160 per eight hours of accrued sick leave; while under the current
Program, that accrued leave could be used for one month of health insurance, valued at
$760. Add. 338.
While the State failed to produce a single State employee who was benefited by
HB 213, it discussed hypothetical scenarios of how, it argued, employees could avoid the
impact of HB 213 on Program I hours. In order to neutralize HB 213's adverse impact,
the following events have to align. First, employees must game the system by exploiting
an unauthorized "loophole" (the State's own word, Add. 265) in HB 213 by retiring on
the earliest possible date of the calendar year, January 2 , thereby limiting the amount
12

that can be contributed to his or her 401(k) plan.
Second, the employee must rely on the State's unwritten, undocumented and
unauthorized interpretation of an ambiguity in HB 213. HB 213 requires that 25% of
both Program I and Program II sick leave hours be converted into a 401(k) contribution,
but it fails to specify how that is to occur when those amounts exceed the federal limits
on 401(k) contributions. There are at least four possibilities: (1) The amounts could be
drawn from Program I first; (2) they could be drawn from Program II first; (3) they could
be drawn equally from each program; or, (4) they could be drawn pro-rata from both
programs depending on the relative amounts in each. The employee's ability to
neutralize the impact of HB 213 depends on which of these interpretations (or some
other) the State chooses to employ. In the District Court, the State represented that it
would use the one most favorable to the employee - i.e., taking the amounts from
Program II first - thus preserving the maximum number of Program I hours. But there is
nothing binding about the State's proposed interpretation. It is not part of the statute. It
is not embodied in any administrative rule. It is not the subject of a valid executive order.
And, arguably, it conflicts with the Legislature's express intent to reduce the cost of the
unused sick leave program.
Third, to avoid having Program I hours converted into a 401(k) contribution,
employees must also allocate all other payouts due them upon retirement - such as for
unused personal leave, salary, compensatory time, etc. - to their 401(k) plans rather than
3

This strategy itself is perverse, as typically employees would want to maximize their
possible retirement contributions while federal caps are imposed to limit their ability to
do so.
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taking them as cash. Otherwise, under federal rules, those additional payouts will raise
the limit on the 401(k) contributions that the employee can receive from the State,
thereby allowing the State to convert more sick leave hours to a 401(k) contribution - the
higher the 401(k) limit, the greater the draw from Program I hours.
Assuming the foregoing loopholes, interpretations, and maneuvers remain
available and practicable, it is hypothetically possible for State employees to end up with
as much insurance coverage for their Program I hours after HB 213 as they could before
HB 213. Add. 340-48. However, this result is achieved only at the sacrifice of other
rights and only under numerous speculative assumptions. Id. ("This example assumes
that the retiree will act to eliminate the shifting of all Program I hours to the State's
401(k) plan by: (1) retiring at the beginning of the plan year (i.e., January 2nd); and (2)
maximizing his or her voluntary contributions (including contributions out of salary and
accrued vacation) for the year of retirement. This example further assumes a sufficient
level of employer nonelective contributions, including contributions from Program II
hours, to fully offset the minimal amount of any remaining uncontributed compensation
for the year.").
The State failed to present any evidence of an employee who would be better off
under HB 213 - that is, one able to purchase more insurance coverage under HB 213 than
under the current Program. Instead, the State presented hypothetical scenarios for Roe 1
that assumed he would be both able and willing to work at least two additional years
beyond his planned retirement date. Add. 342. The State offered no evidence or expert
testimony to support these hypotheticals. Roe 1, Mr. Yockey, expressed substantial
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doubt that he would even be capable of such extended employment. Add. 129.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs' argument is straightforward and relatively simple. Plaintiffs have a
contractual right to redeem their unused sick leave hours in the way the State promised
they could. For decades, State agencies induced their employees to forego using their
sick leave by promising them that upon retirement a set formula would be used to convert
unused sick leave hours into valuable insurance coverage. This benefit was a form of
deferred compensation that the State used to help improve the performance and longevity
of its employees. In reliance on this promise, State employees overwhelming responded
by working more and staying longer. When sick, many used their personal leave
(essentially vacation time) instead of sick leave. And most importantly to the State,
thousands stuck with public employment and its modest salaries while the wages of their
friends and neighbors in the private sector far outstripped their own.
The result was the creation of a binding contractual right to have unused sick leave
hours valued as the State had promised. Although State employment benefits often do
not create enforceable rights, this situation is different for two reasons. First, the State
voluntarily agreed to a contractual duty when its agencies repeatedly chose - without any
statutory obligation - to opt into the unused sick leave program. The law is well settled
that an enforceable, implied contract arises when the government voluntarily undertakes
an additional duty that it would otherwise have no obligation to perform. That occurred
here. Second, the unused sick leave program is a vested contractual right because for
decades the State has used it with the express intent of inducing persons to become and
15

remain its employees; the benefit has long been an important part of the compensation the
State pays for the services its employees render.
The Utah Constitution prohibits the State from taking or substantially impairing
contractual rights without just compensation. Yet HB 213 does exactly that. It
substantially reduces the value of 25% of an employee's unused sick leave hours by
taking those hours and converting them into a significantly less valuable 401(k)
contribution. For many State employees, including the Roe Plaintiffs here, the value of
that uncompensated taking amounts to tens of thousands of dollars.
The State has attempted to deflect these points by claiming that this suit is not ripe
and does not present a proper facial challenge. These arguments are without merit.
There is no question that this case presents a live controversy where very real interests
are at stake; this Court has not been asked to render an advisory opinion. Unless
enjoined, HB 213 will take valuable and vested contractual rights and disrupt
longstanding expectations. Indeed, numerous State employees anxiously await this
Court's decision in this case so they can decide whether to take early retirement so as to
preserve their benefits. The State counters that it is possible, through various complex
maneuvers, for some employees to game the system and thereby avoid the loss of
contractual rights. But the scenarios the State presents are hypothetical and depend on
the abridgement of other important employee interests. In short, Plaintiffs' facial
challenge seeking to enjoin a statute with imminent and adverse consequences for all
State employees is ripe and proper.

16

Accordingly, as set forth in the following argument, Plaintiffs are entitled to an
order enjoining the enforcement/implementation of HB 213 insofar as it effects an
unconstitutional taking of the contractual rights of State employees.
ARGUMENT
L

PLAINTIFFS HAVE A CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO THE UNUSED SICK
LEAVE BENEFIT PROVIDED BY THE PROGRAM.
There are at least two exceptions to the general rule that public employment is a

matter of statute, not contract. First, an implied contract arises when "the government
voluntarily undertakes an additional duty that it would otherwise have no obligation to
perform." Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, If 32, 99 P.3d 842. Second, employee
benefits become contractual rights when they are vested. Under either scenario, to
destroy or "materially lessen" the value of a contract right, as does HB 213, is an
unconstitutional taking. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 626 (Utah 1990).
A.

The State Voluntarily Undertook a Contractual Duty to Permit
Employees to Exchange Accumulated Unused Sick Leave for a Specific
Amount of Post-Retirement Insurance Coverage.

This Court broadly construed the voluntary undertaking exception in Canfield v.
Layton City, 2005 UT 60, 122 P.3d 622. Canfield held that even when a government acts
in the context of a larger statutory scheme, "an implied contract may 'arise from a variety
of sources, including the conduct of the parties, announced personnel policies, practices
of that particular trade or industry, or other circumstances.'" Id. ^ 17 (citations omitted).
Thus, in Canfield, programs implemented by a city under the umbrella of an enabling
statute "potentially create[d] obligations towards employees in addition to those imposed
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by state law" - the statute was an "enabling provision" that authorized voluntary action
"rather than imposing specific obligations on cities in regard to their employees." Id.
11120,21.
In the same way, Utah Code § 67-19-14.2 is an "enabling provision" that
authorizes State agencies, if they choose, to offer an employee benefit above and beyond
what is "imposed" by State law: "An agency may offer the Unused Sick Leave
Retirement Option Program" {id. § 67-19-14.2(l)(b)), and "This program is optional for
each agency" (Utah Admin. Code R477-7-6) (emphasis added). The fact that the statute
defines a possible benefit does not render the agency's decision of whether or not to
extend the benefit any less voluntary or discretionary; after all, an agency must always
act within its statutory parameters, so mere statutory authorization can't be the test.
Moreover, the agency must renew its election annually and independently fund the
benefit, further confirming its voluntary nature. Id.4
An agency's voluntary decision to offer the unused sick leave benefit creates a
unilateral contract: employees accept the offer, and thus the promise of future reward, by
continuing their employment and banking their sick leave instead of using it as it accrues.
After employees perform - including using personal leave instead of sick leave for
medical needs - the State cannot unilaterally alter or rescind the contract. But HB 213
does just that.
4

Canfield distinguishes the Court of Appeals decision in Knight v. Salt Lake County,
2002 UT App. 100, 46 P.3d 247, on which the State has relied in this case, as involving a
mandatory statute that "imposed specific obligations" on the government. Canfield, 2005
UT 60 ^f 18-19 (emphasis added). The Program here does not involve such a statutory
mandate.
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B.

Plaintiffs Have a Vested Contractual Right to the Program's Benefit

Even assuming employees have a mere statutory interest in the Program, the
State's freedom to alter the terms of the Program is limited. An employee's right to the
benefit is vested when she continues her employment and banks her sick leave instead of
using it. Thus, the State cannot modify the Program except "upon a showing that a vital
state interest will be protected, and only where a substantial substitute is provided for in
lieu of the loss of benefit[] sustained." Ellis v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 151 P.2d 882,
885 (Utah App. 1988).
Two seminal cases address the vesting of employee benefits in Utah: Driggs v.
Utah Teachers Retirement Board, 142 P.2d 657 (1943), and Newcomb v. Ogden City
Public School Teachers' Retirement Commission, 243 P.2d 941 (1952). Both cases dealt
with public school teachers' retirement pensions. In both, this Court held that legislative
changes to the pension systems that materially lessened their value were unconstitutional.
In Driggs the Court distinguished between (1) a benefit that is a "mere gratuitous
allowance, springing from the generosity and appreciation of the grantor for a past
service," and (2) a benefit that is "promised for services to be rendered in the future."
142 P.2d at 659, 662 (emphasis added). A gratuitous benefit is clearly terminable at will.
But the latter kind of benefit "forms a part of the inducement for the individual to enter
and remain in the employment, and in that sense is a part of the compensation paid for
those services." Id. (emphasis added). The employer's "[holding] out to its employees
that any one of them who served should be entitled to the pension ... constitute^] an
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offer which the employee [can] fully accept by fulfilling all of the requisite conditions; so
that thereafter his pension [or benefit] [canjnot be reduced in amount." Id. at 659.
In Newcomb the Court reiterated a "contractual" view of employee benefits, i.e.,
that a benefit gives rise to vested rights which cannot be impaired by legislation once the
employee has satisfied the requirements of the benefit. 243 P.2d at 943. Again, the
Court held that a statute or ordinance that provides a benefit
constitutes an offer to which an employee makes a valid acceptance by
meeting the conditions established by law requisite to receiving the
pension. The statute or ordinance becomes a part of the employee's
contract of employment as though actually incorporated therein and the
right to a pension becomes as much a part of the agreed compensation for
the services of the employee as the monthly stipend, but it is deferred in
payment until after his retirement.
Id. Thus, the State cannot remove or impair a benefit without providing a substantial
substitute.
"To hold otherwise would defeat one of the primary objectives in providing
pensions for government employees, which is to induce competent persons
to enter and remain in public employment, [citing cases] It is obvious that
this purpose would be thwarted if a public employee could be deprived of
pension benefits and the promise of a pension annuity would either become
ineffective as an inducement to public employees or it would become
merely a snare and a delusion to the unwary."
Id. at 947 (quoting Kern v. City of Long Beach, 29 Cal.2d 848, 856, 179 P.2d 799, 803
(1947) (alteration in original)); see also Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 770 P.2d
93, 95 and n.l (Ulah 1988) (holding that "[t]he law on this issue is well settled,"
requiring a substantial substitute).5

5

The only other Utah Supreme Court case discussing public employee benefits is Hansen
v. Public Employees Retirement Sys. Bd., 246 P.2d 591 (1952). However, Hansen simply
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The rule set forth in Driggs and Newcomb controls here and dictates a holding that
HB 213 unconstitutionally deprives State employees of a contractual benefit. The benefit
provided by the Program is no mere gratuity. It is offered as an inducement for
employees to forego using sick leave and continue their employment with the State. See
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14(1) (2004) ("The director shall, as an incentive to reduce sick
leave abuse, make rules....") (emphasis added); id. § 67-19-3(16) (2005) (defining "total
compensation" to include "paid leave" and "other benefits offered to state employees as
inducements to work for the state.") (emphasis added). Accordingly, "[t]he offer ...
constitutes a promise for a completed act, and once the act is completed by the acceptor
the offer cannot be modified or withdrawn. It becomes a binding contract." Driggs, 142
P.2d at 659.
The Program's offer to State employees is this: if they work additional hours
rather than using their sick leave, they will receive additional compensation by being able
to bank their unused sick leave so as to purchase one month of additional insurance
coverage for every eight hours of unused sick leave over the 480-hour threshold. Thus,
the Program provides for a simple exchange: employees render additional hours of
service to the State and the State provides additional compensation for those extra hours
worked. Thousands of employees, including the Roe Plaintiffs and UPEA members,
have accepted the Program's offer as they have foregone use of sick leave time by
working additional hours or by using personal leave for medical needs.
The fact that payment of the additional compensation is deferred until retirement
refers to Driggs and Newcomb. Id. at 95-96.
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does not mean that the contract arises only at retirement; it simply means that under the
parties' contract the promised compensation was not due until then. In Driggs and
Newcomb, it was easy for the Court to find that the employees' rights in a pension plan
were vested when the employees in both cases had already retired. However, the Court
did not hold that retirement was a precondition for the rights to vest.
In the more than fifty years since Driggs and Newcomb were decided, employee
benefits have become highly regulated and standardized. For example, the federal
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), requires a minimum
"vesting schedule" for pension plans, including all 401(k)-type retirement plans. I.R.C.
§411. Although that ERISA requirement does not apply to states, the State of Utah has
the functional equivalent of a vesting schedule for its employee pension by mandating
different benefit levels for different lengths of employment service. See, e.g., Utah Code
Ann. §§ 49-12-301(3)(b); -12-401(c), -13-401(c). By contrast, there is no vesting
schedule for the type of benefit provided by the Program.
Most states that have adopted the "contractual" view of benefits now hold - even
for pensions, where mere tenure of service qualifies one for the benefit - that a vested
contractual right accrues upon acceptance of employment or after a probationary period.
See Oregon State Police Officers'Assoc, v. City of Salem, 918 P.2d 765, 773 and n.14
(Or. 1996) (citing cases from ten different jurisdictions).6

6

See also, e.g., Yeazell v. Copins, 402 P.2d 541, 544 (1965); Betts v. Board ofAdm., 21
Cal.3d 859, 863-64, 582 P.2d 614 (1978); Public Employees' Retirement Bd. v. Washoe
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But even if retirement is required for an employee's pension rights to vest in Utah,
the unused sick leave benefit is clearly different.

State employees accept the Program's

offer by their forbearance during the course of employment when they accrue the leave
but decline to use it, not at retirement. In essence, by banking their sick leave, they
purchase an option contract, which they then can exercise under the Program's rules upon
retirement. The Program is a classic form of deferred compensation: employees earn the
compensation over the course of their careers, and they then receive that compensation
after they retire. See Prop. Reg. § 1.409A-l(b)(l); Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed.
("deferred compensation"). The State has essentially conceded this point by arguing that
the current Program provides taxable compensation. See Prop. Reg. § 1.125-1 Q/A 7
(The Program cannot qualify as a cafeteria plan precisely because a cafeteria plan may
not uoffer[] a benefit that defers the receipt of compensation.")
New comb held that deferred payment is a hallmark of vested rights. When an
employee performs, the benefit "becomes as much a part of the agreed compensation for
the services of the employee as the monthly stipend, but it is deferred in payment until
after his retirement." See 243 P.2d at 943. Many cases from other states agree, holding
that accumulated unused sick leave paid at retirement is vested during employment when
employees work in lieu of using their sick leave:

County, 615 P.2d 972, 974 (Nev. 1980); Bailey v. State of North Carolina, 500 S.E.2d 54,
60, 69 (N.C. 1998); Booth v. Sims, 456 S.E.2d 167, 183-84 (W. Va. 1994).
n

If offered by a private employer, the unused sick leave benefit would be a "welfare"
benefit, for which tenure of service is not relevant, rather than a "pension" plan under
ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1) and 1051(1).
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•

"We disagree with the county's claim that the decedent's right to payment for
accumulated, but unused, sick days created a mere expectancy of a future
benefit and, thus, that the decedent had no vested right to the payment for
accumulated, but unused, sick leave .... Such payment is in the nature of
deferred compensation in lieu of wages earned. Once the services are
rendered, the right to receive the promised compensation vests." Gilman v.
County of Cheshire, 493 A.2d 485, 488 (N.H. 1985).

•

"[A] contractual right to compensable accumulated leave is typically
characterized as deferred compensation since it constitutes remuneration for
services already rendered and, to the extent already earned, is not subject to
unilateral divestment by the employer." Caponegro v. State Operated School
Dist. of City of Newark, 748 A.2d 1208 (N.J. Super. 2000).

•

"Leave benefits are part of compensation earned for services rendered and the
right to receive compensation vests once the services are rendered." Bales v.
Aughtry, 395 S.E.2d 177, 179 (S.C. 1990).

•

Pay for "accumulated sick-leave days" "vest[s] upon the date that plaintiff
fulfilled the service condition," and can only be "divested" by failure to satisfy
eligibility requirements. Lawrence v. Bd. ofEduc. of School Dist. 189, 503
N.E.2d 1201, 1209 (111. App. 1987).

•

"The decisions in other state are now generally in agreement that [sick leave]
payments constitute deferred compensation for services rendered." Halpin v.
Nebraska State Patrolmen's Retirement Sys., 320 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Neb.
1982).

Indeed, so widespread is the rule that unused sick leave vests during employment
even though payment is deferred that courts routinely count an employee's accumulated
hours as a marital asset that can be reduced to present value and divided in a preretirement divorce. See, e.g., Schober v. Schober, 692 P.2d 267, 268 (Alaska 1984) (right
to payment for unused leave time was "deferred wages for services rendered" and was
part of marital property); Arnold v. Arnold, 11 P.3d 285, 286 (N.M. App. 2003); Weller v.
Weller, 2002 Ohio 7125 \ 24, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 6956, *9-* 10; Nuss v. Nuss, 828
P.2d 627, 632 (Wash. App. 1992).
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In short, State employees have a vested contractual right to promised
compensation as soon as it is earned, and it is earned when they bank their sick leave, not
when they retire. Any other holding would, at best, render the State's inducement to
employees ineffective; at worst, it would transform the State's promise into "a snare and
a delusion to the unwary." Newcomb, 243 P.2d at 947 (quotations omitted). Ultimately,
the issue here is one of employee trust, government honesty, and the State's moral and
legal duty to keep its promises:
Unfortunately, the state troopers, secretaries, school service personnel,
teachers, highway workers, maintenance employees, assistant prosecuting
attorneys and other ordinary state and local workers are not sophisticated
politicians who expect their government to lie to them. When, therefore,
today's legislature and today's governor make those workers promises,
those workers believe the promises and organize their lives in the
expectation that their government and their employer will treat them
honorably. In these circumstances, the rules cannot be changed after the
employees have substantially relied to their detriment.
Booth v. Sims, 456 S.E.2d 167, 183-84 (W.Va. 1994). When it comes to contractual
obligations that thousands of public employees have relied on, the State has no special
right to void its commitments. "The State is merely a collection of individuals, and there
seems to be no logical reason why the collective entity should not be bound by the same
concepts of justice and morality as its individual members, at least with respect to its
contractual obligations." Driggs, 142 P.2d at 661; see also Gilman v. County of
Cheshire, 493 A.2d at 488 ("Benefits would serve as little inducement if they could be
whisked away at the whim of the public employer.").

?s

II.

HB 213 EFFECTS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING WITHOUT JUST
COMPENSATION.
Whether the contract arises by State agencies voluntarily undertaking to offer the

Program or by the vesting of employee rights, the State cannot unilaterally diminish the
contract benefit without effecting an unconstitutional taking. See Driggs, 142 P.2d at 661
("Valid contracts are property, whether the obligor be a private individual, a
municipality, a state, or the United States.") (quotations omitted).
A taking exists under the Utah Constitution if there is "any substantial interference
with private property which destroys or materially lessens its value, or by which the
owner's right to use and enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed."
Colman, 795 P2.d at 626 (emphasis added, internal quotations omitted). The part of
HB 213 that prevents use of 100% of unused sick leave for continued health and life
insurance coverage will materially and substantially devalue 25% of accumulated unused
sick leave. Therefore, that part of the statute effects a taking of Plaintiffs' contract rights.
A.

The Challenge is Ripe and Plaintiffs Have Standing.

As noted, the magnitude of HB 213's impact on the Roe Plaintiffs, UPEA
members, and other public employees will vary depending on their length of service, the
amount of unused sick leave they have accumulated, and other factors. But that variation
does not undermine the taking claim, its ripeness, or UPEA's associational standing to
represent the interests of its members.
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1.

A Facial Challenge Seeking to Enjoin a Statute with Imminent
and Important Consequences for All State Employees Is Ripe.

There is no question that this case presents an active and viable controversy. It is
a facial challenge to HB 213, not a damages claim or as-applied challenge. The aim is to
enjoin a statute that has not yet become effective before it irretrievably impacts public
employees. "As this allegation does not depend on the extent to which these particular
petitioners are compensated, petitioners' facial challenge is ripe." Yee v. City of
Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 533 (1992). If the State is correct that no plaintiff could
challenge a statute until it has becomes effective and he or she has been damaged, no
facial challenges to laws could ever be brought, which of course is not so.
Furthermore, here there is no question how HB 213 will be applied to State
employees: with regard to accrued Program I hours, 25% of those hours (up to federal
limits) will be taken and converted into a far less valuable 401(k) contribution. The fact
that it is conceivable (although totally unproven) that some hypothetical employee might
be able to alter his behavior so as to mitigate the impact of HB 213 does not preclude a
facial challenge.
Moreover, unlike the federal courts, this Court "is not constitutionally restricted to
'cases' and 'controversies'" {Utah Safe to Learn-Safe to Worship Coalition, Inc. v, State,
2004 UT 32, Tf 19, 94 P.3d 217 (quotations omitted)), but will liberally entertain actions
by parties seeking a declaration of their rights: "[T]he rule is that the court will be
indulgent in entertaining actions brought to achieve that objective; and more particularly
so, where there is a substantial public interest to be served by the settlement of such an
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issue." Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570P.2d 119, 121 (Utah 1977) (footnotes
omitted; citations omitted). A case is ripe for adjudication "where it appears 'there is an
actual controversy, or that there is a substantial likelihood that one will develop so that
the adjudication will serve a useful purpose in resolving or avoiding controversy or
possible litigation."' Salt Lake County Comm 'n v. Short, 1999 UT 73 at ^J12 (quoting
Salt Lake County, 570 P.2d at 121).
These circumstances exist here; there is no argument that the issues raised in this
case are somehow hypothetical or call for an advisory opinion. The controversy is very
real indeed. As discussed, Plaintiffs (especially Roes 1 and 2 and numerous other UPEA
members who have accumulated more than the 480-hour threshold and are eligible to
retire) have a present, contractual right to the Program benefit. HB 213 materially lessens
the value of that benefit, and the statute is set to become effective upon termination of
this appeal. The Court's injunction staying the implementation of HB 213 acknowledges
both the imminence of the controversy and the dramatic impact on employees who face
an immediate choice either to retire early or forfeit the full benefit of their unused sick
leave.8

8

In State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1996), this Court addressed the closely related
issue of standing to bring a facial challenge. The Court explained that in reviewing this
issue it would first consider whether the party challenging the statute had a "personal
stake in the controversy" and not "'[a] mere allegation of an adverse impact.'" Id.
(quoting Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983)). In the absence of a personal
stake, then the party would still have standing if there were no challenger with "a 'more
direct interest in the issues who can more adequately litigate the issues.'" Id. (quoting
Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1150). Finally, the challenger may yet have standing if the court
determines that '"the issues raised by the [complainant] are of sufficient public
importance in and of themselves to grant. . . standing.'" Id. (quoting Jenkins, 675 P.2d at
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2.

UPEA Has Associational Standing to Assert Its Members'
Interests Because Injunctive Relief Does Not Require Individual
Determinations.

Likewise, contrary to the District Court's decision, UPEA has associational
standing to prosecute the interests of its members, even though HB 213 will impact those
members differently. In Utah Bankers Ass 'n v. America First Credit Union, 912 P.2d
988 (Utah 1996), the Court held that an association had standing to assert its members'
differing claims because "claims for declaratory and injunctive relief would not need to
be tailored to the needs of each individual member." Id. at 993. The same is true here.
Acknowledging an association's standing "has the advantage of permitting the
prosecution of legitimate claims by an entity with the capacity to spread the costs of
litigation among its members and to assume the burdens incident to it, rather than
requiring a single litigant to carry the entire load"; "deny[ing] an association standing
under such circumstances just might deter the assertion of valid claims without serving
any countervailing public purpose." Utah Restaurant Ass 'n v. Davis County Bd. of
Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Utah 1985).9

1150) (alterations in original). Such a public urgency exists when "'the constitutionally
protected interests infringed . . . are so important that their protection need not await the
perfect plaintiff.'" Id (quoting Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 457 (Utah
1989)). All of these criteria are met in this case.
9

Regardless of the UPEA's associational standing, the individual Roe Plaintiffs clearly
have standing.
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B.

The Taking Is Significant and There Is No Substantial Substitute.

HB 213's taking of Plaintiffs' contract rights is significant and without substantial
substitute. It will dramatically reduce the value of 25% of accrued employee benefits,
which for the Roe Plaintiffs and other public employees means years of future insurance
coverage.
The State Legislature's Fiscal Analyst estimated a daily impact of $600 per
employee, based on a salary of $20 per hour, an eight-hour work day, and post-retirement
insurance coverage worth $760 per month. Add. 338 (Fiscal Note for HB 213). Using
these numbers, an employee with 1,000 hours of accumulated unused sick leave is
entitled to receive 65 months of additional post-retirement health care coverage under the
current Program after the 480-hour reduction - a $49,400 value. HB 213 forces an
employee to cash out 25% of his or her accumulated unused sick leave as a 401(k)
contribution of lesser value. Under HB 213, this same employee would receive a 401(k)
contribution of $5,000 and only 33 months of additional post-retirement health care
coverage - a $25,080 value. All told, the employee ends up with approximately $19,000
less under HB 213, or a 38% reduction in the 25% of accrued unused sick leave affected
byHB213.
The impact on the Roe Plaintiffs, who have accumulated thousands of hours of
unused sick leave, is even more stark:
•

Mr. Anderson will lose 72 months of continued insurance and receive a
retirement plan contribution that is 64% less than the present value of that
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insurance, for a total economic impact of 19% in the value of all his
accumulated unused sick leave.
•

Mr. Yockey will lose 60 months of insurance and receive a retirement plan
contribution worth 57% less than the present value of that insurance, for a total
economic impact of 23% in the value of accumulated unused sick leave.

•

Ms. Anderson will lose 50 months of insurance and receive a retirement plan
contribution that is 76% less than the present value of that insurance, for a total
economic impact of 24% in the value of accumulated unused sick leave.

•

Roe 5 will lose 25 months of insurance and receive a retirement plan
contribution worth 90% less than the present value of that insurance, for a total
economic impact of 23% in the value of accumulated unused sick leave.

This impact is a substantial taking by any measure. Cf. Bailey v. State of North Carolina,
500 S.E.2d 54, 69 (N.C. 1998) (statute revoking tax exemption for vested retirement
benefits was an unconstitutional taking); Wisconsin Retired Teachers Assoc, Inc. v.
Employee Trust Funds Bd, 558 N.W.2d 83, 86-87, 89 (1997) (statute reducing benefit
payment to some retirees by 2.4-2.6% was a taking).
The State has argued that some employees could finagle as much insurance
coverage under HB 213 as under the current Program. But that argument is misleading
and would require sacrificing yet other rights. Under the argument, these employees
must minimize the Federal limit on retirement plan contributions {see I.R.C. § 415(c)(1),
(d)) and then fill up that limit by (1) contributing all of their salary for that year to their
401(k) plan and (2) converting every other non-salary benefit (such as unused vacation
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time) into a 401(k) contribution rather than cashing out such benefits. In other words,
they must retire at the start of the calendar year - January 2nd - and allocate all other
payouts upon retirement - salary, unused personal leave, etc. - to the retirement plan.
Thus, they would have to sacrifice other forms of compensation they otherwise would be
entitled to receive in cash.10
Further, the State's argument focuses on exceptions at the fringes - employees
who by gaming the system might come out the same under the new Program. But that
should not be the focus. Most employees intend to exchange accumulated unused sick
leave for insurance coverage and most will be impacted by HB 213's restriction.11 Add.
339. The entire focus of HB 213 is to "reduce personnel costs to the state" (Add. 338),
which it does on the backs of its most loyal and tenured employees without just
compensation in return.

The only suggestion that employees might be able to purchase more health care
coverage under HB 213 than under the current Program required retirement-eligible
employees (such as Roes 1 and 2) postpone retirement for a number of years.
The State has also made much of HB 213's phase out of the 480-hour threshold
for exchanging unused sick leave. Add. 334 (HB 213 § 67-19-14.2(2)(b)). However, this
phase out either hurts State employees or, at best, leaves them no worse off. The
threshold phase-out directly corresponds with a phase out of the automatic 5-year
extension of insurance coverage. The end result is that employees with at least 480 hours
of unused sick leave obtain the same amount of insurance coverage as they could today,
while those with less than 480 hours will end up with less coverage. The only potential
beneficiaries are employees already over age 60 with at least 480 unused sick leave hours
who are able and desire to continue working for at least two more years. The State
presented no evidence that any such employees exist.
11

The cash payout or 401(k) contribution makes sense for short term employees or
employees who have not accumulated the threshold 480 hours of unused sick leave. But
the State's own figures show that this pool is both small and static. In dollars, it
constitutes less than 10% of the benefits paid to retiring employees for unpaid sick leave.
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Most critically, however, the State's argument overlooks the obvious fact that
HB 213's impact on employees is much more than mere dollars. HB 213 frustrates
employees' long-laid plans about the timing and terms of retirement - it requires
employees to sacrifice their preferred date of retirement in order to preserve their
promised benefits. The same holds for their ability to cash out personal leave,
compensatory time, excess time, and other such benefits. To avoid the impact of HB 213
they must even forego present use of their salary for the year of retirement, perhaps
requiring them to live off their non-retirement savings to meet expenses. The sacrifices
HB 213 requires of State employees are substantial.
In Johnson v. Retirement Board, 770 P.2d 93 (1988), this Court struck down a
statute preventing sheriffs and police chiefs from collecting retirement benefits while
remaining employed. Id. at 94-95. As here, the State argued the change would not
impact plaintiffs because they would receive the same (or perhaps larger) payments later
on. However, the Court resoundingly rejected that argument:
This argument ignores the increased risk associated with delay that
pensioners would be assuming under the modified plan. It makes the
questionable assumption that the time value of money is irrelevant to
plaintiffs' ultimate gross receipts. Most importantly, it oversimplifies the
choice placed before the plaintiffs and fails to consider the possibility that
plaintiffs may have already relied to their detriment on the immediate
availability of these pension funds.
Id. at 96 (emphasis added).
Relying on Driggs and Newcomb, the Court in Johnson specifically held the
amendment was not a "substantial substitute" because it "add[ed] the requirement that
plaintiffs leave their current employers in order to receive the exact same benefit to which
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they have a vested right" under the prior statute. Id. (emphasis in original). The Court
required a concrete showing (which the State could not provide) "that such an arbitrarily
interjected requirement" was necessary to maintain the pension plan's actuarial
soundness. Id.
That holding applies with equal force to this case. HB 213's new Program I is not
a substantial substitute for the current Program because, under the State's argument, it
adds the "arbitrary" requirement that employees must retire on January 2nd and sacrifice
other cash payouts to receive the exact same amount of post-retirement insurance
coverage; otherwise, employees will receive substantially less, as illustrated in the case of
the Roe Plaintiffs. Similarly, to obtain more coverage under the State's hypothetical
scenario, the small number of employees for whom this might be a possibility would
have to postpone retirement for years. These new requirements take away or severely
burden employees' choices, undermine their life plans, and are unrealistic. Many
uncontrollable factors influence when an employee retires: health, stamina, family needs,
financial means, personal or professional development, religious obligations, etc.
Retirement is a life-changing decision that employees plan for and anticipate for years,
but it can also come unexpectedly with, for example, a sudden illness or a spouse's job
transfer.
Roes 1 and 2, though eligible for retirement, do not intend to retire before HB 213
takes effect. Add. 46, 49-50. Moreover, Roe 1 questions whether he is physically
capable of postponing his planned retirement for the additional years that would be
required for him to obtain more insurance under Program I. Add. 129. Numerous other
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State employees are in the same positions.
HB 213 forces employees immediately and irrevocably to decide retirement now or if they wait, on January 2nd - to preserve the unused sick leave they had banked and
relied on for the future. Employees have sacrificed their personal leave time for illnesses
or medical needs. In other words, they have spent their "vacations" being sick so that
they could spend their healthy days on the job serving the people of Utah.
Here, as in Johnson, Driggs and Newcomb, the State voluntarily made an offer to
its employees through the Program. The Roe Plaintiffs, UPEA's members, and
thousands of other State employees have accepted that offer as they have foregone the
use of sick leave time by working additional hours or by using personal leave for medical
needs. The resulting contract entitles Plaintiffs to the benefit of the Program. By
depriving them of this contract right, HB 213 adversely impacts Plaintiffs both
economically and in their ability to determine the timing and circumstances of their
retirement. That impact is an unconstitutional taking without just compensation.
III.

HB 213 SHOULD BE PERMANENTLY ENJOINED TO THE EXTENT IT
TAKES STATE EMPLOYEES' CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS.
This Court recently set forth the standard for granting a permanent injunction:
A court may grant a permanent injunction if it determines that (1)
the petitioner establishes standing by demonstrating special damages, (2)
the petitioner has a property right or protectable interest, (3) legal remedies
are inadequate, (4) irreparable harm would result, (5) court enforcement is
feasible, and (6) petitioner merits the injunction after balancing the equities.

Johnson v. Hermes Associates, Ltd., 2005 UT 82,112,
All of these elements are satisfied here:
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P.3d

(footnote omitted).

(1) The actual injury that HB 213 will inflict on the Roe Plaintiffs and thousands
of other similarly situated State employees is real, peculiar to them, and not mereiy an
injury to broad public interests. Plaintiffs' standing is not in question.
(2) As established, Plaintiffs have "protectable" contractual rights that HB 213
will destroy.
(3) There is no adequate legal remedy (in the sense of damages) because the State,
through HB 213, is terminating Plaintiffs' legal right to compensation. A permanent
injunction is the necessary means, in other words, to force the State to pay the
compensation it is contractual obligated to pay. While it is conceivably possible to
calculate the value of the loss suffered by each of the thousands of State employees, the
practicality of doing so is prohibitive. Equitable relief is therefore appropriate.
(4) Similarly, the irreparable injury requirement is satisfied when a plaintiffs
damages, if an injunction is not granted, would be difficult, or perhaps impossible, to
accurately establish. Hunsaker v. Kersh, 1999 UT 106 *{ 9, 991 P.2d 67 (1999) (quoting
System Concepts v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 427-28 (Utah 1983)). As just noted, that is
precisely the case here. Moreover, unless enjoined, HB 213 will irreparably violate
Plaintiffs'constitutional rights.
(5) The feasibility of court enforcement is not an issue. Requiring the State to
comply with its contractual obligations essentially maintains the status quo. Little or no
additional enforcement would be necessary if an injunction is issued against the
offending portions of HB 213.
(6) Lastly, the equities weigh heavily in Plaintiffs' favor. HB 213 will strip

••
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vested rights that State employees have relied upon for years, sometimes decades. It will
take valuable financial resources from loyal State employees who have been undercompensated their entire careers. It will disrupt retirement plans as State employees
scramble to adjust their schedules and game the system so as to mitigate their losses; for
some, it will force early and immediate retirement. In short, HB 213 breaks the State's
longstanding promises and diminishes its integrity and trustworthiness. There is no
countervailing State interest sufficient to overbalance these adverse effects. The equities
are served by this Court enjoining an unconstitutional law. See Licensed Beverage Assn.
v. Leavitt, 256 F.3d 1061, 1076 (10th Cir. 2001).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should permanently enjoin implementation
of HB 213 insofar as it amends Utah Code § 67-19-14.2 to abridge the contractual rights
of State employees.
REQUEST FOR HEARING
Plaintiffs respectfully request a hearing on this matter. The Court has already set a
hearing on this matter for January 10, 2006, at 2:00 p.m.
DATED t h i s ^ d a y of December, 2005.
KIRTON & McCONKIE
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